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Abstract
Banks in the euro area typically hold a large amount of government debt in their bond port-
folios, which are valued both for their low credit risk and high liquidity. During the sovereign
debt crisis, these characteristics of government debt were severely impaired in stressed euro
area countries. In order to understand the transmission channels of stress from government
debt markets to the real economy, we augment a standard dynamic macroeconomic model
with a banking sector and a market for government debt characterized by search frictions. A
sovereign solvency shock modelled as a haircut on government bonds is introduced to study
the interaction of sovereign credit and liquidity risk. As banks react to this shock by re-
balancing towards highly liquid short-run assets, such as central bank deposits, demand for
government bonds collapses, which endogenously worsens their market liquidity. Thus, a
sovereign liquidity risk channel from government bond markets to the real sector emerges.
Endogenous government bond liquidity negatively affects the funding conditions of the fiscal
sector, tightens financing constraints in the banking sector and lowers investment and output.
The model is able to match a number of stylised facts regarding the behaviour of sovereign
debt markets during the euro area sovereign debt crisis, such as depressed turnover rates and
rising bid-ask spreads.
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1 Introduction
The euro area sovereign debt crisis exposed a powerful sovereign-bank nexus. Concerns about the
sustainability of public debt sent government bond yields soaring. Credit risk premia surged and
the liquidity of sovereign debt markets was severely impaired as captured by sharply rising bid-
ask spreads and strong declines in turnover volumes. At the same time, the euro area interbank
market became deeply fragmented and bank funding costs rose, such that lending conditions
for non-financial firms and households deteriorated. This further stifled the already depressed
economic activity with adverse consequences for fiscal revenues and public debt sustainability,
thereby reinforcing the debt crisis.
This paper aims to understand interlinkages between the government and the banking sector
arising from the features of government bonds as highly liquid assets, which are held in financial
sector for refinancing purposes. We ask how a deterioration of the market liquidity of government
bonds, triggered for instance by a shock to a sovereign’s credit quality, impairs the funding condi-
tions of banks and spills over to the macroeconomy. To answer this question, we propose a general
equilibrium model in which (long-term) government bonds are traded on a search market, which
is intended to capture both outright transactions in government bonds as well as refinancing oper-
ations collateralised by government debt. This stylised set-up allows us to study the endogenous
propagation - and amplification - of stress from government bond markets via banks to the real
sector and to identify feedback effects on the funding conditions of the fiscal sector.
Our approach complements the growing literature that models the spill-over of sovereign credit
risk to the macroeconomy, e.g. Bi (2012); Bi and Traum (2012b); Bi and Leeper (2013); Broner
et al. (2014); Corsetti et al. (2013). This literature typically argues that sovereign funding strains
spilled over into private credit markets by adversely affecting nonfinancial firms’ funding costs.
However, it does not shed light on the precise transmission channels through which stress on
sovereign debt markets propagates to the real economy. By explicitly modelling the economic
function of government bonds for the financial sector as a hedging instrument against market
liquidity risks in normal times, we are able to identify a sovereign liquidity risk channel of shock
transmission and amplification that operates in times of stress.
The search market set-up for government bond transactions is designed to capture the struc-
tural features of limit order inter-dealer markets on which large parts of euro area government
bonds are traded (Pelizzon et al., 2013; Cheung et al., 2005). In these markets, bond portfolios
are only partially resaleable and market liquidity fluctuates over time as shown by both price
and volume measures. During the euro area sovereign debt crisis, for instance, bid-ask spreads in
transactions of government bonds of stressed countries soared (see Figure 1) and market depth
in terms of turnover volumes declined substantially. Following Cui and Radde (2014), we are
able to generate these features endogenously by explicitly modelling impediments to transactions
in government bonds due to search and matching frictions. Lower turnover on the market for
government bonds is analytically shown to result in widening bid-ask spreads and higher liquidity
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risk premia, which increase the financing costs of the government.
Figure 1: Bid-ask spreads for 5-year bonds
In a version of the model calibrated to the Italian economy, we introduce an exogenous haircut
on long-term government bonds as a laboratory experiment to analyse the interaction between
credit and liquidity risk in sovereign bond markets and their macroeconomic implications. The
impulse responses to the sovereign solvency shock reveal that its first-order wealth effects are
amplified by tightening financing constraints in the banking sector due to an endogenous deterio-
ration of government bond saleability and prices. This impairment of government bonds’ market
liquidity results from a reduction in demand for such assets as their value as a hedge against future
financing constraints falls. Instead, the model predicts a flight to more liquid assets such as central
bank deposits or money, which squares well with the flight-to-liquidity dynamics observed during
the sovereign debt crisis (García and Gimeno, 2014).
The reaction of banks to the solvency shock has direct and indirect implications for the fiscal
position of the government. The fall in the market price of government bonds in response to
lower demand immediately increases the government’s funding costs as the value of bond issuance
declines. More indirectly, the concomitant flight to liquid assets bids up the relative price of
long-term bonds in real terms, such that the government’s debt burden rises. If the government
covers its additional financing needs by issuing more debt, bond liquidity from the perspective of
private investors deteriorates further as the additional public supply crowds out private sellers in
the market. These rich macroeconomic interactions show that accounting for the economic role of




There is a vast amount of empirical studies suggesting that liquidity risk is a crucial driver of
sovereign yield spreads during crises, while a growing body of both theoretical and empirical
research attests to the existence of sovereign-bank interlinkages, whose degree depends, inter alia,
on banks’ government bond holdings. This literature has guided the choice of key features of the
model presented in this paper.
The role of liquidity in pricing government bond risk. Since the onset of the euro area crisis, a
large body of research has focused on the topic of sovereign risk pricing, i.e. government bond yield
spreads, with considerable attention given to the fiscal-financial nexus. The literature generally
distinguishes three factors influencing the premia asked by investors to hold a euro area government
bond versus a benchmark bond (for instance, the German bund). First, sovereign bond spreads
comprise a credit risk premium that accounts for a country’s creditworthiness as reflected by its
fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals. Second, spreads reflect a liquidity risk premium that
compensates investors for impediments to trading government bonds, which depends on the size,
depth and structure of the government bond market. Third, government bond spreads may be
influenced by international risk aversion, i.e. investor sentiment towards this asset class across
different sovereigns.
These three categories of factors are not orthogonal; interdependencies exist and are usually
found to strengthen in times of crisis. For instance, credit risk may influence both market liquidity
and investor risks aversion, while the liquidity factor may be essential in explaining why investors
demand similar premia for countries with very different fundamentals.
There is by now compelling empirical evidence that, while not being a dominant pricing factor
during normal times, liquidity risk becomes acute during crisis episodes. The euro area sovereign
debt crisis stands out in this respect. Many studies covering the global financial crisis starting
in 2008 find that liquidity risk was statistically significant in explaining sovereign yield spreads
in the euro area, although its impact was smaller compared to credit risk or international risk
aversion (Attinasi et al., 2009; Barrios et al., 2009; Haugh et al., 2009; Sgherri and Zoli, 2009). A
common international risk factor is generally found to have played an important role in explaining
spreads on account of a broad-based flight to safety (FTS). This view is corroborated by García
and Gimeno (2014), who find strong comovement of liquidity premia across euro area sovereign
debt markets during the global financial crisis. The euro area sovereign debt crisis, in contrast, is
characterised by an asymmetric response of liquidity spreads in stressed and non-stressed countries
due to portfolio reallocations, which is interpreted as a strong indication for a flight to liquidity
(FTL). Extracting a common euro area liquidity shock from the KfW-Bund spread, Monfort and
Renne (2013) disentangle credit and liquidity risk premia in European sovereign bond markets.
Their study shows that the common liquidity factor is an important driver of the dynamics of
sovereign yield spreads during liquidity-related crises. These findings are corroborated by studies
using liquidity measures directly gleaned from tick-by-tick trade and quote data from individual
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broker-dealers for European sovereign bonds.1 For instance, Darbha and Dufour (2013) show that
liquidity was an important pricing factor for sovereign bond spreads during the global financial
crisis and the early stages of the euro area sovereign debt crisis for bonds rated AA and lower,
but not for AAA rated bonds. Moreover, the authors show that the bid-ask spread is the single-
best predictor of bond yields among the trade- and quote-based liquidity measures. Exploiting
similar data, Pelizzon et al. (2013) find evidence of a dynamic relationship between market liquidity
(using alternative quote- and trade-based liquidity measures) and credit risk (as measured by CDS
spreads) during the sovereign debt crisis. Their analysis suggests that market liquidity reacted to
contemporaneous and lagged changes in credit risk during this period. However, this relationship
is found to be non-linear and it changes in the presence of heightened credit risk (e.g. spreads
above 500bps). In the latter cases, evidence suggests a contemporaneous and stronger interaction
between credit and liquidity risk.2 Finally, Dewachter et al. (2015) suggest that euro area sovereign
bond spreads are largely explained by fundamental shocks, but that non-fundamental shocks have
become more dominant since the onset of sovereign debt crisis.
Studies focussing on longer pre-crisis periods generally find that liquidity is not a significant
driver of sovereign bond spreads during ‘’normal‘’ times, while gaining relevance during episodes
of uncertainty. Schuknecht et al. (2009, 2010); Pagano and von Thadden (2004); Jankowitsch et al.
(2006) all find that over long horizons liquidity differences play at most a minor role in explaining
sovereign bond spreads in the euro area. Pasquariello and Vega (2007) present similar evidence for
the US Treasury bond market, where swings in order flow are generally linked to macroeconomic,
i.e. fundamental, news. On the other hand, Gomez-Puig (2006) finds that liquidity risk is the most
important factor explaining sovereign bond spreads after the introduction of the euro. Studying
the pre-crisis period, Beber et al. (2009) find that while the bulk of sovereign yield spreads is
explained by differences in credit quality, liquidity plays a larger role during times of heightened
market uncertainty and especially for low credit risk countries. In particular, the study shows that
large order inflows are strongly determined by search for liquid assets. Moreover, in periods of large
flows, liquidity explains a larger fraction of sovereign yield spreads, particularly at the long end
of the yield curve. The study concludes that credit quality matters for bond valuation but that,
in times of market stress, investors chase liquidity. These findings are in line with Goyenko et al.
(2010), who study liquidity premia of on-the-run and off-the-run US Treasury bonds. Their results
suggest that liquidity differences between these two groups widen during recessions, attesting to
a flight to liquidity.
Sovereign-bank interlinkages. Although still limited, the literature provides theoretical and
empirical support for important fiscal-financial interlinkages, whose severity depends on several
factors, most importantly: (i) the amount of domestic sovereign bonds held by domestic banks,
1The data is obtained from the MTS (Mercato Telematico dei Titoli di Stato) Global Market bond trading
system. The MTS market is the largest interdealer trading system for Euro-zone government bonds, which is largely
based on electronic transactions. See Cheung et al. (2005).
2Interestingly, the analysis also finds that the causality reversed after the introduction of the ECB’s LTRO
programme, with a reduction in liquidity risk Granger causing an improvement in credit risk.
4
depending inter alia on the role of government debt for bank liquidity management; (ii) the
size, capital structure, and initial financial condition of the banking sector; (iii) the initial fiscal
condition of the sovereign; and (vi) the extent to which banking crises cut through to the real
sector, thereby adversely affecting tax revenues.
As regards the role of sovereign debt for the liquidity management in the banking sector,
Gennaioli et al. (2014) point to the importance of government bonds as collateral in the secured
interbank market. One of the hypotheses they test concerning banks’ holdings of government
bonds and their effects during sovereign defaults reflects the liquidity view, that is, banks hold
sizeable amounts of government bonds on a regular basis to store liquidity and to post them as
collateral in borrowing arrangements. They find that high pre-crisis exposure to government bonds
negatively affects banks’ lending capacity after sovereign defaults.
Several papers analyse the impact of bank rescue packages and financial spillovers in the
euro area. Attinasi et al. (2009) use dynamic panel regression techniques and show that the
announcement of bank bailout measures triggered a transfer of risk from the financial to the
government sector. The risk for sovereign-bank spillovers is especially severe in post-bank bailout
periods. To the extent that the domestic banking sector holds large amounts of government bonds,
yield- and CDS spreads in both the banking and sovereign sectors comove as a result of increased
sovereign credit risk. Acharya et al. (2011) provide an empirical study and a model to document
and capture such a two-way feedback between banks and governments. Focusing on different
compositions of Euro area countries, the studies of Ejsing and Lemke (2011), Mody and Sandri
(2012) and Stanga (2011) show a similar pattern.
In terms of theoretical literature, Bi (2012); Bi and Traum (2012b); Bi and Leeper (2013);
Bocola (2014); Corsetti et al. (2013) amongst others provide DSGE models to study the impact of
strained government finances on macroeconomic stability and the transmission of fiscal stimulus or
austerity policies. They analyse a sovereign risk channel according to which higher risk premia on
sovereign debt feed into the refinancing costs of private firms, thereby constraining private sector
borrowing and investment. Rather than providing a rationale for the financial sector holdings
of sovereign bonds, this strand of literature focusses on the macroeconomic implications arising
from fiscal limits, i.e. the point at which adjustments to the primary balance can no longer
accommodate the sovereign debt burden and a haircut becomes inevitable.
Although we have a similar propagation of sovereign risk premia to private sector funding costs
in mind, we focus on endogenous fluctuations in the liquidity service provided by sovereign bonds
to the banking sector in response to a sovereign solvency shock as the key transmission mechanism.
2 The Model
The model environment closely follows Cui and Radde (2014) in extending a standard real business
cycle (RBC) model with endogenous asset market liqidity. Throughout the model, the liquidity
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of financial assets is captured by the ease of issuance and resaleability and the price impact of
trading these assets. There are three types of assets: Equity stakes in capital producers are risky
and only liquid at issuance. Long-term government bonds are traded on a search market, such
that their degree of liquidity is endogenously determined. Finally, the government sector also
issues a risk-less and fully liquid one-period asset, which can be traded on a spot market and may
be thought of as central bank deposits or short-term bonds.
Time is discrete and infinite (t = 0, 1, 2, ...). The economy comprises three sectors: households
- split into populations of bankers with lending opportunities and workers -, capital goods pro-
ducers and final goods producers. Final goods producers rent capital and labour to generate the
numeraire (consumption) good. Capital goods producers undertake new investment under perfect
competition and finance by selling state-contingent securities to lending banks. Banks intermedi-
ate the savings of the household sector and finance private securities. In addition to these agents
there is a government sector, which comprises a monetary and a fiscal authority.
2.1 Capital and Final Goods Producers
Capital goods. There is a measure one continuum of capital producers, some of which face invest-
ment opportunities. They enlarge their capital stock by converting final goods one-to-one into
capital goods. In order to finance this investment, producers issue state-contingent securities to
financial intermediaries at price q. Each security represents a state-contingent claim to the flow
of returns from one unit of capital. Due to perfect competition, intermediate goods producers
earn zero-profits in every state of the world and the value of a security equals the holding banks’
valuation. To keep the model simple, we refrain from modelling a more elaborate capital structure
of capital producers and, hence, also refer to these private financial claims as loans.
Final goods. A measure one continuum of producers assembles final goods (Y ) in a perfectly
competitive environment. They operate a constant returns to scale technology using capital (K)





with α ∈ (0, 1) and za,t capturing total factor productivity. The profit-maximising labour demand
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Household sector structure and financial frictions. The economy features a representative house-
hold comprising a unit measure of members. Household members are either workers or bankers.
Workers earn wages by supplying labour. Bankers do not work, but provide intermediation ser-
vices by channelling part of the household’s savings to capital producers in the form of loans. In
addition to loans, the household sector owns a portfolio of long-term government bonds and liquid
assets, which are held by its members. During each period, there is perfect consumption insurance
within each group of household members.
As discussed in section 4, we will focus on an equilibrium in which lending to capital producers
is profitable as the market price of loans exceeds banks’ cost of creating new loans. In order to
take full advantage of such profitable lending opportunities, banks will want to maximise funding
by liquidating their government bond portfolios as well as selling stakes in loans on the market.
However, asset sales are restricted by two key frictions: i) Only a fraction θ of newly issued loans
can be sold in the market, while existing loans are entirely illiquid, i.e. there is no market for
these claims. ii) Search frictions afflict the trading of long-term bonds. In particular, for every
unit of long-term bonds offered for sale only a fraction φi - which will be endogenously determined
- can be liquidated. As a result of these frictions, lending banks need to retain a fraction (1− θ)
of new loans as well as a fraction (1− φi) of long-term bonds, such that they become financially
constrained.
Timing. The timing of events is shown in Figure 2. At the beginning of each period t, aggregate
shocks materialise. The representative household specifies policy rules for all its members regarding
consumption and dividends, labour supply, (costly) selling and buying offers for long-term bonds,
liquid asset positions and loan sales.
Then, an idiosyncratic type shock splits workers from banks. More specifically, a member
becomes a banker with probability χ. By the law of large numbers, a share χ of household
members thus become intermediaries, while the remaining fraction 1− χ are workers. Assets are
distributed unequally across household members with bankers retaining a fraction η.3
After types have been determined, final goods producers employ labour from households and
rent capital to produce consumption goods. The rental income on capital accrues to banks as
their payoff on loans to capital producers. At this stage, banks redeem liquid assets in exchange
for consumption goods. Then, each individual bank meets a counterpart for trading long-term
government bonds in the search market and bargains over the price (in terms of consumption
goods). The counterparts are workers, to whom households delegate saving. Banks subsequently
extend new loans to capital producers and issue as many claims to these on the market as possible.
Once asset portfolios have been determined, banks consume their dividends.
3We use both parameters to separately calibrate the ratio of banks’ reserve accumulation to household con-
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Figure 2: Intra-period timing
At the end of period t, household members of both types meet again and share their newly
accumulated assets.4
2.2.1 Maximisation Problem




βt+s [U(ci,t+s, cn,t+s)− (1− χ)h(ht+s)] , (3)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, U(ci,t, cn,t) =χu(ci,t) + (1 − χ)u(cn,t) is the total utility
derived from consumption by banks (ci,t) and workers (cn,t). u(.) is a standard strictly increasing
and concave utility function, and h(.) captures the dis-utility derived from labour supply nt. Et
is the expectation operator conditional on information at time t.
Aggregation. As all household members of the same type are homogeneous, we can aggregate
individual member’s type-specific variables for the sub-sectors of banks i (investing) and workers
n (non-investing). In particular, aggregate variables in each sub-sector are defined as Xi,t ≡ χxi,t
and Xn,t ≡ (1 − χ)xn,t. As banks are allocated a fraction η of the household’s a assets, while
workers are endowed with the remaining fraction (1− η), we have Xi,t = ηXt, Xn,t = (1− η)Xt
for Xt ∈ {St, Bt, Dt}, where St, Bt, Dt denote the representative household’s claims on capital
producers (loans), long-term government bonds and net liquid assets.
For simplicity, we now switch to recursive notation such that x and x′ denote xt and xt+1.
First consider the evolution of both types’ loan and long-term bond portfolios. Lending banks
purchase claims on the proceeds of new capital goods Ii from capital producers, which are akin
4The idea of capturing intra-period heterogeneity by a representative family with temporarily separated agents
goes back to Lucas (1990).
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to loans. A fraction θ of these can be resold to workers. Loans accumulated in previous periods,
on the other hand, are illiquid and need to be retained.5 Given capital depreciation at rate δ, the
loan portfolios of banks and workers thus evolve according to
S ′i = (1− δ) ηSt + (1− θ) Ii, S ′n ≥ (1− δ) (1− η)St (4)
Lending banks can obtain further funding for new loans by liquidating their bond portfolios.
While short-term government bonds mature each period, long-term bonds are modelled as per-
petuities with coupon payments decaying at rate λ following Woodford (2001). The parameter
λ can also be interpreted as controlling the average maturity of the long-term bond portfolio.
This specification thus offers a parsimonious way of capturing a portfolio of bonds with diverse
maturities.6 In addition, we introduce a haircut ∆ imposed on bondholders in a partial default
by the government following Bi (2012); Bi and Traum (2012a) and Bocola (2014).7 We treat ∆ as
an exogenous mean-zero stochastic process.8
Long-term bonds need to be sold on a search market as explained in detail in section 2.3. For
each unit Ei of previously accumulated long-term bonds (1−∆)ληB offered on this market, only
a fraction φi can actually be sold to a counterparty. Therefore, banks need to retain a fraction
(1− φiEi) of their beginning-of-period long-term bond position. Workers, on the other hand, may
choose to post En orders for long-term bond purchases, a fraction φn of which will be matched.
Long-term bond positions of both types at the end of subperiod 2 are, thus,
B′i = (1− φiEi) (1−∆)ληB, B′n = (1−∆)λ (1− η)B + φnEn (5)




















Let j ∈ {i, n} denote banks and workers. Both types use their net worthNj to finance consumption
and dividend payments Cj, respectively, and asset portfolios at the end of subperiod 2 consisting of
loans S ′j, long-term bonds B′j and liquid assets Dj. Note that the valuation of loans and long-term
bonds differs across types; we now discuss these differences in detail. Workers value their loans at
the market price q. Lending banks, on the other hand, can originate and partially sell new loans,
5As we normalise claims on capital producers to the size of the capital stock, both depreciate at the same rate.
6It also nests the special cases of a consol paying 1P perpetually (λ = 1) and a one-period bond (λ = 0).
7While these papers introduce a non-linearity by distinguishing a default- from a non-default regime, we model
shocks to δb as a continuous process in order to maintain tractability.
8See section 4.
9These are obtained from individual banks’ type-specific constraints, which are derived in Appendix A.1.
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This price captures the effective replacement cost of loans for banks. Recall that lending banks
can sell a fraction θ of new loans at price q to workers. Hence, they need to finance an amount
(1− θq) of every unit of new loans, of which they retain a fraction 1−θ; in other words, they need
(1− θq) / (1− θ) numeraire goods to acquire one unit of future loans.
On the search market for long-term bonds, buyers and sellers bargain for a transaction price qb.
As search market participation is assumed to be costly for both sides, the effective long-term bond
prices also reflect these type-specific search costs. Search costs are intended capture dealer fees and
commissions incurred through direct trading on government bond markets or more general costs
of participating in collateralised interbank loan markets. In particular, we assume that buyers face
nominal costs κn in proportion to posted orders En. As only a fraction φn of orders is matched,
the effective cost per unit of accumulated long-term bonds is κn
φn,t
, such that buyers effectively
value long-term bonds at unit price




Similarly, sellers face nominal costs κi in proportion to the amount of assets posted for sale
Ei (1−∆)λχB. Since only a fraction φi of posted assets are sold, sellers bear an effective cost κ
i
φi,t
per unit of long-term bonds, such that they effectively value long-term bonds at unit price




Household members’ current net worth derives from the return on previously accumulated
assets and labour income for workers, i.e.
Nn = (1− η)
[







+ (1− τH)wH (11)
Ni = η
[








where returns on capital are taxed at rate τS and loans and bonds are valued at the the type-specific
prices discussed above.
Maximisation problem. Let V (S,B,D; Γ) denote the value function of the representative house-
hold with loans S, long-term bonds B and net liquid assets D, given a vector of aggregate state
variables Γ whose evolution is taken as given by the household. Since banks and workers reunite
at the end of every period to share their assets and liabilities, we have S ′ = S ′i +S ′n, B′ = B′i+B′n,
D = Di + Dn. Finally, let EΓ denote expectations taken in period t given the aggregate state
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variables Γ. The Bellman equation associated with the household’s optimisation problem then
reads
Problem 1:



















+ βEΓ [V (S ′, B′, D; Γ′)] (13)
s.t. (6), (7)
2.3 Search and Matching in the Bond Market
Search and matching. Matching between buyers and sellers of long-term government bonds
takes place in a decentralized market. Lending banks seek to sell their long-term bonds to
workers in order to free up resources for new loans. Recall that banks offer a fraction Ei of





n − (1−∆)λ (1− η)B] as per equation (5). Buy and sell orders are randomly
matched, with the number of aggregate matches M being determined by the matching function
M ≡ ξ [Ei (1−∆)ληB]γ E1−γn (14)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of matches w.r.t posted assets. Defining θ as the ratio of buy to






= ξθ−γ , φi ≡
M
Ei (1−∆)ληB
= ξθ1−γ , (15)
where φi captures the endogenously determined probability of a sell order being matched by a buy
order, and φn the probability of a buy order being matched by a sell order. Note that θ reflects
search market tightness from a buyer’s perspective. A larger θ indicates that buyers find it harder
to find an appropriate counterpart on the search market, such that buy orders are large compared








Bond price. Once their positions have been matched, banks and workers bargain over how to
split the surplus of a transaction of long-term bonds. Importantly, the amount of matched assets
is predetermined at the point of bargaining. Therefore, buyers and sellers interact at the margin,
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i.e. the match surplus for both buyers and sellers is the respective marginal value of an additional
transaction.
Let V i and V n denote banks’ and workers’ value from the perspective of the household. The
marginal value of a match for either type is then given by the envelope condition on the respective
type’s value with respect to a successful match, i.e. V im for sellers and V nm for buyers. An individual
buyer’s surplus in terms of consumption goods then amounts to10












Intuitively, a buyer pays q
b
P
for the matched government bonds, which decreases consumption by
a fraction 1 − β of that amount given logarithmic utility. The consumption sacrificed today for
the purchase is valued at marginal utility u′ (cn). At the same time, the purchase increases future
bond holdings while reducing available resources for additional future lending. In particular, for
every unit of government bonds purchased at q
b
P
today, the household forgoes the opportunity to
spend a fraction β of it’s member’s net worth on future loans at current price q.
The seller’s surplus is the marginal value to the household of an additional match for banks,
which is given by
V im = u












A seller receives additional resources q
b
P
per match, increasing his current consumption by 1 − β
valued at marginal utility u′ (ci). The continuation value captures the effect of the sale on the





for each unit of matches as bonds are only partially saleable. These assets are returned to the
household at the end of the period and, thus, increase future long-term bond holdings B′. There-
fore, the continuation value of a match comprises the marginal value of future long-term bonds
to the representative household multiplied by this factor. Moreover, banks invest a fraction β of
the additional resources q
b
P
gained in a match on new loans at internal cost qr, thus increasing the
household’s future loan portfolio S ′.
Due to the homogeneity of members within the groups of buyers and sellers, the type-specific
valuations are identical in all matched pairs. The transaction price qb is determined via (general-
ized) Nash bargaining between buyers and sellers over the total match surplus, i.e. agents bargain








+ (1− ω) ln (−V nm)
}
(17)
10Individual’ values are derived in appendix B.1. Note that search costs are sunk at the time of bargaining.
However, they are not ignored, since they are taken into account by the representative household when deciding
on bond market participation.
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where ω is the fraction of the surplus going to sellers. In the case of bilateral bargaining, ω also
represents the bargaining power of sellers.
2.4 The Government
The fiscal authority. Government expenditures consist of (fixed) consumption, coupon payments
on long-term bonds and interest payments on liquid assets. To finance its budget, the fiscal
authority collects taxes, issues long-term bonds (Bg) and receives transfers from the monetary
authority corresponding to the new issuance of liquid assets (D′ −D). The consolidated budget















B′ = (1−∆′)λB +Bg (19)
and we assume that the government never purchases long-term bonds, i.e. Bg ≥ 0. We further
assume that the fiscal authority takes the bargained bond price as given rather than entering
the bargaining process itself. However, by changing the supply relative to the demand of long-
term bonds, new issuance affects the matching probability of sellers φi. This, in turn, affects the
bargaining price through general equilibrium effects as shown in 3.2.11
The government levies lump-sum, which are modelled by a simple rule that ensures stationarity
of government indebtedness, in particular











is the ratio of government debt at face value to GDP, ψT1 is the steady state
level of taxes and ψT2 captures the elasticity of lump-sum taxes to deviations of the debt-to-GDP
ratio from its steady state. ψT2 > 0 ensures that taxes increase in response to rising government
indebtedness.
The monetary authority. Conventional monetary policy involves setting the nominal interest
11With government issuance of long-term bonds the amount of assets for sale on the search market is
BM ≡ Ei (1−∆)ληB + φ−1i Bg = φ
−1
i [B
′ −B′i + (1−∆)λ (η − 1)B]
Scaling the targeted government issuance by the inverse of the probability of finding a buyer ensures that the
government actually issues the targeted amount.
13






where ψR calibrates the steady state gross riskless interest rate and ψπ determines the reaction of
the central bank to deviations of inflation from its steady state. Inflation is defined as π′ ≡ P ′
P
.
Moreover, the central bank controls the supply of liquid assets. Thus, the fiscal authority
cannot decide on the contribution of liquid asset issuance to the consolidated government budget
(19).12






Unconventional monetary can be captured by an expansion of the stock of liquid assets in response
to a tightening of liquidity conditions in the long-term bond market with ψD > 0.
2.5 Competitive Equilibrium
The recursive competitive equilibrium is characterised by a set of equations determining the con-
sumption, labour and portfolio choices (Ci, Cn, H, K ′, S ′, S ′i, S ′n, B′i, B′n, D′i, D′n), search market
features (φi, φn) and prices (q, qr, qb, Qi, Qn, r, P , π) given exogenous stochastic processes for
(z′a,∆′) and policy rules for (Tl, D′, R′). This set of equations satisfies
1. individual optimality: Given prices and search market characteristics, the policy functions
satisfy the optimality conditions of final goods producers (1)-(2) and solve the representative
household’s problem 1. Investment I is determined by (7).
2. market clearing conditions for
(a) securities/loans and capital: S ′ = (1− δ)K + I and K ′ = S ′;
(b) the search market: (16) holds, the search market price qb solves (17), while the effective
prices are defined in (9) and (10);
(c) long-term bonds: the government budget constraint (18) is satisfied with outstanding
long-term bonds evolving according to (19);
(d) short-term bonds: (22) holds;
(e) final goods: The workers’ budget constraint (6) is satisfied;
3. policy rules: for lump-sum taxes (20) and the riskless interest rate (21) with inflation defined
as π′ ≡ P ′
P
.
12This modelling choice follows Gertler and Karadi (2013). It is a short-cut to modelling liquid assets as money
or an international safe-haven asset, neither of which is controlled by the domestic fiscal authority.
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3 Equilibrium Characterisation
We focus on an equilibrium in which the search market is active, i.e. in which banks are financially
constrained and want to trade long-term government bonds to finance a larger loan portfolio. For
this to be the case, the market price of loans must exceed one, i.e. q > 1. Using the definition of qr
in equation (8), we know that this implies a replacement cost strictly below one, such that we have
q > 1 > qr. In other words, creating loans at the replacement cost and selling them at the market
price is a profitable business. Therefore, the representative household will prompt lending banks
to spend whatever net worth they are not consuming on issuing new loans. Accordingly, banks





They also go short on liquid assets as much as possible, i.e. D′i = 0.
3.1 The Household’s Optimality Conditions
By using the type-specific budget constraints (6) and (7) to substitute out consumption Cn and
dividends Ci in Problem 1, and using Ei = 1 and D′i = 0 we can reduce the representative
household’s choice set to {H,S ′i, S ′n, B′n, D′n}.
The household’s optimal labour supply satisfies
u′(cn) (1− τH)w = µ (23)
The first-order conditions for household members’ loan holdings Si and Sn read
u′ (ci) qr = βEΓ [VS (S ′, B′, D′; Γ′)] , u′ (cn) q = βEΓ [VS (S ′, B′, D′; Γ′)]
which implies
u′ (ci) = ρu
′ (cn) (24)
where ρ ≡ q
qr
is inversely related to risk sharing between lending and non-lending banks.13 As
long as lending banks are financially constrained, such that loan origination is profitable, we have




= βEΓ [VB (S ′, B′, D′; Γ′)] , u′ (cn)
1
P
= βEΓ [VD (S ′, B′, D′; Γ′)] .
Using the appropriate envelope conditions, we can derive the corresponding asset pricing formulae































is defined as π′ ≡ P ′
P
and
ζ ′1 ≡ [ηρ′ + (1− η)] (1− τ ′S) r′ + (1− δ) q′
ζ ′2 ≡ [ηρ′ + (1− η)] + (1−∆′)λ [ηρ′φ′iQ′i + (1− η)Q′n]
ζ ′3 ≡ [ηρ′ + (1− η)]R′.
3.2 The Bargained Bond Price
The sufficient and necessary first-order-condition to the bargaining problem (17) that maximises







This condition can be further consolidated to obtain an analytical expression for the bargaining
price summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1:
The search market bargaining price
1. is given by
qb =
ω + φi − 1




2. correlates positively with bond saleability (i.e. ∂q
b
∂φi










































− (ρ− 1) (1− ω)
)1/2
. (27)
With ω ≈ 1 and ρ ∈ (1, 1.5], the bounds approximately collapse to 0 / φi / 43 , such that the
upper bound will never be binding, since by construction φi ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. See appendix B.1.
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Proposition 1.1 links the bond price with demand-side search market participation costs. It
immediately implies that higher search costs crowd out demand for long-term bonds and erode
the surplus that can be garnered from a match, which leads to a fall in the bond price. Search
costs thus capture the intermediation capacity of bond markets in our model.14
The search market features of the bond market further give rise to a non-trivial realtionship
between the bond price and endogenous bond saleability. When bond saleability drops banks need
to finance a larger share of loans out of yields on own funds rather than asset liquidations. This
tightens their contemporaneous financing constraints. Therefore, banks’ threat point of breaking
off negotiations over the marginal bond sale and self-financing becomes less attractive. They are
thus willing to accept a lower bargaining price. On the other hand, with lower bond saleabil-
ity lending banks retain a larger fraction of bonds, which will be returned to the representative
household. This relaxes the funding constraints of future generations of banks with lending oppor-
tunities, which is valued by the household and, hence, increases the bargaining price. Proposition
1.2 shows that the contemporaneous effect dominates in this trade-off between current and future
funding constraints as long as the sales rate is small enough, because current financial constraints
bind strongly in this case.15
This feedback between bond saleability and the bond price is triggered whenever bond market
participation becomes less attractive for buyers, such that bond saleability drops. Our model
can thus generate simultaneous decreases in bond saleability and the bond price through the
simultaneous reaction of supply and demand.
4 Numerical Results
This section presents the results of the numerical solution of our model in order to illustrate
macroeconomic dynamics in response to exogenous shocks. The model is solved using a first-order
approximation around the non-stochastic steady state.
Shock processes. Total factor productivity is assumed to evolve according to an AR(1) process,
i.e.
z′a = ρaza + ε
′
a (28)
where 0 < ρa < 1 and ε′a is a normally distributed random variable with mean zero and standard
deviation σa. In the baseline calibration, we set ρa = 0.9 and σa = 0.01.
In addition, we introduce an exogenous haircut on long-term bonds to capture a partial
sovereign default. In expectation, this sovereign solvency shock is zero. In particular, we set
14(26) implies that when κn → 0, the long-term bond prices goes to zero. Without search costs, long-term bonds
lose their liquidity premium and thus yield less than short-term bonds (or deposits) as long as R ≥ 1. Therefore,
investors would prefer short- to long-term bonds and the market for long-term bonds would collapse with the price
going to zero.
15In fact, the contemporaneous effect dominates for all plausible calibrations.
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∆ = z∆ where z∆ follows an AR(1) process
z′∆ = ρ∆z∆ + ε
′
∆ (29)
where 0 < ρ∆ < 1 and ε′∆ is a normally distributed random variable with mean zero and standard
deviation σ∆. In the baseline calibration, we set ρ∆ = 0.8 and σ∆ = 0.01. While this shock
destroys resources, it does not affect the production frontier of the economy. This is a key property
to understanding the endogenous response of bond market liquidity and the fight to liquidity in
the banking sector.
Utility. To facilitate the analysis we assume log-utility without loss of generality for both
workers and banks, i.e. u (cj,t) = ln (cj,t) for j ∈ {i, n}.
4.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match long-run characteristics of the Italian economy. An overview
of all parameters and calibration targets is shown in Table 1. All data sources and definitions of
targets are detailed in Appendix C.
Preferences and Production Technology. Household preferences are parameterized exogenously
with standard values for the discount factor β and the coefficient capturing relative risk aversion
σ. The utility weight of leisure targets a steady state working time of 30%. The depreciation rate
of capital δ and the capital share of output α are chosen such that the model replicates the long-
run (post 2001) averages of the capital-output and the investment-output ratio, which amount
to 300% and 20.3%, respectively. Taken together, these two targets imply an investment-capital
ratio of about 7%.
The parameters that govern the mass of bankers and their share of total financial assets are less
common. The former is chosen to match a target for banks’ dividends Ci as a share of households’
consumption Cn. Since the model does not allow for inside equity accumulation and all retained
earnings are essentially consumed by bankers, we measure this share as the accumulation of capital
and reserves in the Italian banking sector relative to final consumption expenditure by the private
sector, which was on average 1.54% since 2001. This target yields a population share of bankers
of χ = 1.63% in our model economy. In addition, we account for the fact that banks are strongly
leveraged compared to households by obtaining the banking sectors’ share of all financial assets
as η = 4.76%, i.e. about three times bankers’ population share. In other words, compared to
households, banks finance a much larger amount of assets relative to their population share. Since
both sectors’ asset shares are proportional to their respective net worth in the model, we calibrate
banks’ asset share by targetting the model net worth ratio with the average ratio of bank equity
to household net worth observed between 1997 and 2006. During said period, this ratio was very
stable at around 4.8%.16
16Starting with the financial crisis, this ratio embarks on an increasing path due to both nominator and denom-
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Liquidity Frictions. Frictions associated with the sale and purchase of financial assets are
parameterized by the vector {γ, ξ, κ̄n, κ̄i, ω, θ}. Since the supply sensitivity of matching γ and
matching efficiency ξ never occur independently of each other, we exogenously set γ = 0.5 without
loss of generality and determine matching efficiency endogenously as a function of some steady-
state target. The remaining parameters related to search frictions {ξ, κ̄n, κ̄i, ω} are jointly chosen
to match the following targets: i) average turnover rates from the perspective of sellers and
buyers of Italian government bonds; ii) the long-run average of bid-ask spreads for 10-year Italian
government bonds; iii) the ratio of liquid to total assets in Italian banks’ balance sheets.
Bond saleability φi and purchase rate φn are set to match average turnover rates of Italian
government bonds on the MTS interdealer trading system gleaned from Pelizzon et al. (2013).
Exploiting both transaction and quote data reported in this study, average turnover rates are
calculated as the ratio of the total traded quantity of bonds to the total quoted quantity on either
side of the market during the entire sample period.17 The bid-ask spread, normalised by the mid-
point between bid and ask prices, is set to the post 2001 average of 10 basis points observed for
10-year Italian Government Benchmark bonds reported by Reuters. We target the bid-ask spread
of 10-year benchmark bonds since these capture long-term refinancing conditions. The extent
to which liquidity frictions affect financing conditions and the real economy crucially depends
on banks’ dependence on liquid assets. In order to quantify the importance of liquid assets in
the Italian banking sector, we target the ratio of Italian banks’ holdings of liquid assets to their
total assets. According to the World Bank’s Global Financial Development database, this ratio
amounted on average to 24.5% post 2001.
Finally, we calibrate the fraction of loans that is liquid at issuance to match Tobin’s Q estimated
in Hall and Oriani (2006) at 1.1 based on firm-level panel data for the Italian economy.
Government. As discussed in section 2.2.1, modelling long-term government bonds as perpetu-
ities with decay rate λ, may, equivalently, be interpreted as a portfolio of government bonds with
average maturity 1
1−λ . Broner et al. (2014) show that the Italian sovereign’s maturity structure was
stable since 2001 with an average maturity of seven years. The government consumption-output
ratio is set to its post 2001 average of 19% to calibrate Ḡ. The parameters of the tax policy rule,
ψT1 and ψT2, are chosen exogenously to ensure stationarity of the government budget constraint.
The quarterly steady-state riskfree interest rate is set to 1.005, implying an annual gross nominal
rate of 1.02. Interest rate policy is shut off in the baseline calibration by setting ψπ = 0, i.e. the
central bank only controls the supply of liquid assets.
inator effects, which we do not want to capture.
17Since the reported quote statistics are average across both sides of the market, we cannot distinguish between
turnover rates for sellers and buyers. Therefore, we bind our hands by assuming that turnover rates are symmetric
for both sides.
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Table 1: Baseline calibration
Description Parameter Value Target/Source
Preferences and Production Technology
Household discount factor β 0.99 Exogenous
Relative risk aversion σ 1 log-utility
Utility weight on leisure µ 5.1557 Working time: 30%
Mass of bankers χ 0.0163 Reserve accumulation-Consumption ratio: 0.01
Asset share of bankers η 0.0476 Bank equity-Household net worth ratio: 0.05
Depreciation rate of capital δ 0.0667 Investment-Capital ratio: 0.07
Capital share of output α 0.2521 Capital-Output ratio: 3.00
Liquidity Frictions
Supply sensitivity of matching γ 0.5 Exogenous
Matching efficiency ξ 0.4000

Bond market turnover, sellers: 40%
Buyer search costs κ̄n 0.0035 Bond market turnover, buyers: 40%
Seller search costs κ̄i 0.0021 Bid-ask spread: 10 bps
Bargaining weight of sellers ω 0.9998 Banks′ liquidity-ratio: 0.25
Liquid issuance of loans θ 0.0562 Tobin′s Q: 1.1
Government
Decay rate of coupon payments λ 0.9643 Average maturity of bonds: 7 years
Government consumption Ḡ 0.0825 Government consumption-Output ratio: 0.19
Lump-sum tax, steady state ψT1 0.1474 Exogenous
Lump-sum tax, elasticity ψT2 0.1500 Exogenous
Steady state gross nominal interest rate ψR 1.0050 Annual gross riskless rate: 1.02
Taylor coefficient on inflation ψπ 0.00 Exogenous: money (=0) or deposits (>0)
Notes: The model is calibrated to quarterly frequency.
4.2 Equilibrium Responses to Shocks
Adverse aggregate productivity shocks. The impact of a negative productivity shock on real vari-
ables shown in Figure 3 is similar to that in a real business cycle model. A decrease in total
factor productivity lowers the return to capital and, hence, the demand for capital goods. This is
reflected in the falling capital price and a sharp reduction in investment activity. Output drops on
impact on account of lower factor productivity and returns only sluggishly due to the depressed
capital stock.
The investment dynamics are reinforced by the portfolio choices of workers and bankers. As
the negative productivity shock persistently decreases the return to capital it also makes loan-
financing less profitable in the future. As a result the hedging value of long-term bonds and liquid
assets drops and the demand for both assets falls. On the bond market, less buy offers result in
lower bond liquidity from the sellers’ perspective, which is reflected in their lower turnover rate φi.
On the market for liquid assets, the fall in demand has indirect fiscal implications that interact
with demand and supply conditions on the bond market. Notice that the price of liquid assets is
one over the price of the numeraire good, i.e. 1
P
. This price of liquid assets decreases with weaker
demand. As a result the real value of government debt B
P
falls, such that the fiscal authority
can reduce its issuance of long-term bonds. The drop in government supply on the bond market
pushes up the bargaining price through general equilibrium effects.
The decrease in the real value of government bonds is compensated on impact by the fall
in GDP, such that the debt-to-GDP ratio rises temporarily. However, the debt-to-GDP ratio
eventually contracts as bond issuance falls. Lump-sum taxes follow the path of the debt-to-GDP
20
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Figure 3: Impulse responses after a negative one standard deviation productivity shock.
ratio by assumption.
As the demand for liquid assets shrinks, so does banks’ liquidity ratio. Over time, it gets
pushed back up, however, by a denominator effect as the value of total assets shrinks with the
decrease of the capital price. The bid-ask price declines as buyers’ turnover rate increases, such
that the demand-side search costs per match fall.
Finally, the decline in lending and investment is propagated through a sustained drop in banks’
net worth.
Aggregate Sovereign Solvency Shocks. We introduce an exogenous haircut on long-term govern-
ment bonds as a laboratory experiment to analyse the interaction between credit and liquidity risk
in sovereign bond markets. The impulse responses are shown in Figure 4. The sovereign solvency
shock destroys financial wealth of bond holders while providing debt-relief to the sovereign. These
first-order effects of the shock are amplified by tightening financing constraints in the banking
sector due to endogenously deteriorating bond liquidity. Again, these effects are best understood
by considering the portfolio choices of banks and savers.
Being persistent in nature, the haircut reduces both the current and future value of long-term
bonds holdings. As a result, the hedging value of long-term bonds against future financing con-
straints for banks erodes, such that households reduce their demand for long-term bonds. Declining
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buy orders on the search market for bonds depress bond saleability φi as the market becomes more
congested from the point of view of bond-selling banks. Conversely, buyers encounter sellers more
easily, such that the purchase rate φn increases. Due to this asymmetry in the response of bond
liquidity for buyers and sellers the intermediation capacity of the bond market declines, i.e. its
capacity to channel liquid funds where financing constraints are felt most ostensibly. As their
financing constraints tighten due to the falling saleability of bonds, banks are willing to accept a
lower transaction price on the bond market, such that qb strongly declines (see Proposition 1.2).
The price decline tightens financing constraints further, giving rise to a downward spiral.
In contrast to the negative productivity shock, the solvency shock does not impair the produc-
tivity of capital goods, such that investment projects remain profitable. Anticipating continued
illiquidity in the bond market, households would like to hedge against future financing constraints
by shoring up their liquidity buffers. Hence, savers fly to liquid assets, which is reflected in the
strong and persistent increase in the liquidity ratio. The strong fall in bond saleability also in-
creases search costs per unit of bonds offered for sale, such that the bid-ask spread soars. These
model predictions for the behaviour of variables capturing liquidity frictions contrast starkly with
the productivity shock dynamics.
As for real variables, investment declines on impact as tighter financing constraints in the
banking sector weigh on loan supply. Again, the decline in lending and investment is propagated
through a sustained drop in banks’ net worth, which depresses capital acccumulation going forward.
Output also contracts on impact as households reduce their demand in response to the negative
wealth shock associated with the haircut on bonds and lower bond prices.
The solvency shock also has fiscal implications beyond the first-order debt relief. The flight to
liquidity triggered by the endogenous decline in bond saleability bids up the price of liquid assets
1
P
, which also inflates the real debt-burden B
P
. The falling bond price qb exerts further upward
pressure the government’s financing costs. The government compensates these additional costs by
strongly increasing long-term bond issuance.
Note that the increase in the price of liquid assets 1
P
corresponds to a fall in the price level
P , i.e. lower inflation. The drop in inflation combined with higher issuance initially increase the
real value of bonds outstanding despite the debt relief provided by the haircut. Coincidentally,
the sharp increase in bond issuance contributes to the deterioration of bond saleability as the
additional government supply crowds out private sellers.
4.3 Robustness
Having argued that the anticipation of future financing constraints due to prolonged liquidity
frictions in the bond market is key for the dynamics observed after sovereign solvency shocks,
we now illustrate the impact of variation in shock persistence on aggregate dynamics. Varying
degrees of persistence may effect macroeconomic variables both directly via the negative wealth
effect associated with exogenous haircuts, and indirectly via the impact of financing constraints
22
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Figure 4: Impulse responses after a one standard deviation sovereign solvency shock (increase of
haircut).
on investment.
Impulse responses are shown in Figure 5 for the baseline calibration with high persistence
(ρ∆ = 0.8), medium (ρ∆ = 0.6) and low persistence (ρ∆ = 0.2). Although the responses are
qualitatively similar, this comparison confirms that the persistence of solvency shocks is, indeed,
crucial for both the magnitude of macroeconomic responses on impact and the speed of adjustment.
In particular, these results suggest a non-linear relationship between shock persistence and liquidity
frictions. As solvency shocks are expected to last longer, bond liquidity is anticipated to be low
both today and in the future. The protracted illiquidity of bonds tightens financing constraints
of banks, such that the hedging value of liquid assets increases. Banks react by rebalancing their
portfolios towards liquid assets, thereby increasing their liquidity ratios.
The increasing demand for liquid assets implies a more pronounced rise in their price 1/P ,
which is mirrored in more subdued inflation. The higher is inflation, the longer the eventual
decrease in real bond holdings due to weaker demand for nominal bonds is delayed.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses after a one standard deviation sovereign solvency shock (increase of
haircut) with different degrees of persistence.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we analyse the interaction of sovereign credit and liquidity risk and the impact of
endogenous fluctuations in government bond liquidity on financial intermediation, bank lending,
investment and government finances. We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model that
endogenises government bond liquidity through search and matching frictions. The model is able
to match a number of stylised facts regarding the behaviour of sovereign debt markets during
the euro area sovereign debt crisis, such as depressed turnover rates and rising bid-ask spreads.
In the model, lower bond market liquidity constrains the funding capacity and ultimately the
profitability of the banking sector, leading to subdued lending, slower capital accumulation and
declining economic activity. As bond prices fall together with bond liquidity, the revenue of bond
issuance accruing to the public sector falls as well. Thus, the model demonstrates how endogenous
declines in government bond liquidity reinforce the sovereign-bank nexus.
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βt+s [U(ci,t+s, cn,t+s)− (1− χ)h(ht+s)] , (A.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, U(ci,t, cn,t) =χu(ci,t) + (1 − χ)u(cn,t) is the total utility
derived from consumption by banks (ci,t) and workers (cn,t) and h(.) captures the dis-utility derived
from labour supply nt. Suppose that and u (cj,t) = ln (cj,t) for j ∈ {i, n}.
The flow-of-funds constraint of a typical household member x then reads:


















+ (1− τH,t)wthj,t (A.2)
Expenditures consist of i) dividend payments cj,t, ii) newly issued loans ij,t, iii) issuance or pur-
chases of claims on the marketable fraction of these new loans [sj,t+1 − ij,t − (1− δ) sj,t] at price qt,
iv) adjustments to the portfolio of liquid assets dj,t+1
Pt
and v) search costs associated with purchases
and sales of nominal long-term bonds. We assume that buyers face nominal costs κn in proportion
to posted orders enj,t. Similarly, sellers face nominal costs κn in proportion to the amount of assets
posted for sale eij,t (1−∆)λbj,t.
Income derives from returns to the stock of loans (equity stakes in capital producers) net of




, and revenue from sales of long-term bonds mj,t
Pt
at bargained price qbt .
Bonds and loans evolve according to
bj,t+1 = (1−∆)λbj,t −mj,t
sj,t+1 ≥ (1− δ) sj,t + (1− θ) ij,t
As existing loans are entirely illiquid, only a fraction θ of newly issued loans can be sold in the
market.
Workers. An individual worker j = n supplies labour hn,t > 0, but does not have new lending
opportunities, such that
in,t = 0, e
n
n,t ≥ 0, ein,t = 0
Purchases of long-term bonds amount to mn,t = −φn,tenn,t, such that the evolutions of bond- and
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loan-holdings become
bn,t+1 = (1−∆)λbn,t + φn,tenn,t
sn,t+1 ≥ (1− δ) sn,t
Using these, the flow-of-funds constraint simplifies to the balance sheet constraint












where net worth is defined as















Banks. An individual bank j = i has new lending opportunities, but does not supply labour
hi,t = 0, such that
ii,t > 0, e
n
i,t = 0, e
i
i,t ≥ 0
Sales of long-term bonds amount to mi,t = φi,teii,t (1−∆)λbi,t, such that the flow-of-funds con-
straint can be simplified to
cj,t + (1− θq) ij,t +
dj,t+1
Pt





































si,t+1 = (1− δ) si,t + (1− θ) ii,t

















where net worth is defined as
ni,t =
(



















A.2 Dynamic Equilibrium Conditions







Given the aggregate state variables (S, B, D, R, za, zξ), we are then solving for
(Ci, Cn, H, S
′, K ′, I,B′,B′i,D′, T, φi, φn, q, qr, ρ, qb, Qi, Qn, r, w, π)
together with exogenous stochastic processes for (z′a, z′ξ, z′δ) and policy rules for (Tl, τS, τH , D′,
R′) from the following set of dynamic equations
1. Individual optimality
(a) Banks





























































































ζ ′1 ≡ [ηρ′ + (1− η)] (1− τ ′S) r′ + (1− δ) q′
ζ ′2 ≡ [ηρ′ + (1− η)] + (1−∆′)λ [ηρ′φ′iQ′i + (1− η)Q′n]
ζ ′3 ≡ [ηρ′ + (1− η)]R′
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2. Government policy rules
(a) Fiscal policy







τH = ψτH (A.19)
τS = ψτS (A.20)























3. Market clearing conditions
(a) Goods
Cn + Ci + qI +QnB′ +D′ + Tl =






+ (1− τH)wH (A.24)
(b) Bonds (inflation)






= T +D′ +QiB′ (A.25)
(c) Securities/credit
S ′ = (1− δ)K + I (A.26)
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(d) Capital










ω + φi − 1













z′a = ρaza + ε
′
a (A.32)
z′ξ = ρξzξ + ε
′
ξ (A.33)
z′δ = ρδzδ − ε′δ (A.34)
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1.1. Workers’ value satisfies
V n (mn) =
∫
j∈i
u (cj) dj +
∫
j∈n
u (cj) dj + βE [V (S ′, B′, D′; Γ)]


























The value function consists of current utility as well as the discounted future value of the house-
hold, since workers join the representative household at the end of a period and type-shocks are
idiosyncratic over members and time. Note that with logarithmic utility, agents optimally consume
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a fraction β of their net worth, i.e. the consumption-savings choice is given by









Then, the marginal or excess value of an additional match can be expressed as































Note that using the definition of matches from the perspective of banks, mi = eiiφi (1− δ) bi,
the evolution of bonds can be rewritten in terms of matches rather than the beginning-of-period





mi. Then, lending banks’ value satisfies
V i (mi) =
∫
j∈i
u (cj) dj +
∫
j∈n
u (cj) dj + βE [V (S ′, B′, D′; Γ)]






























The consumption-savings choice is, again, given by









The marginal or excess value of an additional match from the perspective of a selling bank is


































Note that Ei = 1 implies eii = 1 due to homogeneity. Using the first-order-conditions for loans,
u′ (cn) q = βEΓ [VS] and u′ (ci) = ρu′ (cn), and bonds, u′ (cn) QnP = βEΓ [VB], we can then simplify
the valuations of workers and banks and plug them into the bargaining solution (1− ω)V im =
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Qn − (1− β) qb
]
By applying the definitions of the effective bond-price from buyers’ perspective Qn = qb + κnφn , this
expression can be rewritten as (26).





i in the analytical expression for the


























A necessary and sufficient condition for ∂q
b
∂φi
> 0 is for the RHS of (B.1) to be non-negative. This



















In our calibration, we set γ = 0.5 without loss of generality, since γ is not independent of ξ in the









ρ−1 < 0. It follows that the
necessary condition for the bargaining price to correlate negatively with saleability is φi < 23
1
ρ−1 .
The simplified sufficient condition can be further solved to obtain a lower and an upper bound on



























− (ρ− 1) (1− ω)
)1/2
(B.2)
Suppose that ω ≈ 1, then the bounds approximately collapse to 0 / φi / 23
1
ρ−1 . Suppose further
that ρ ∈ (1, 1.5], such that the minimum value for the upper bound is 4
3
. Then, the upper bound




> 0 implies ∂q
b
∂φn




















Hence, the same parameter restriction that ensures ∂q
b
∂φi






Investment- and Government consumption-output ratios
Series: fixed capital formation, final consumption expenditure (general government), gross domes-
tic product (all at market prices). Source: Eurostat, National Accounts (ESA2010). All series in
euros, quarterly frequency, neither seasonally nor working day adjusted. Ratios are computed as
four-quarter moving averages.
Capital-output ratio
Series: Net capital stock per unit of gross domestic product at constant market prices. Source:
European Commission, AMECO. Annual frequeny.
Reserve accumulation-consumption ratio
Series: a) Final consumption expenditure (total less general government); b) capital and reserves
(MFIs), net, flows. Sources: a) Eurostat, National Accounts (ESA2010); b) ECB, Balance Sheet
Items Statistics. All series in euros, annual frequency.
Bank equity-household net worth ratio
Series: a) Financial net worth (households); b) Capital and reserves (MFIs excluding ECB re-
porting sector), net. Sources: a) Eurostat, Annual Sector Accounts (ESA2010); b) ECB, Balance
Sheet Items Statistics. All series in EUR, annual frequency, outstanding amounts at the end of
the period (stocks).
Banks’ liquidity ratio
Series: a) Bank deposits to output: The total value of demand, time and saving deposits at
domestic deposit money banks as a share of GDP. Deposit money banks comprise commercial
banks and other financial institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as demand deposits.
b) Deposit money banks’ assets to output: Total assets held by deposit money banks as a share
of GDP. Assets include claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector which includes central, state
and local governments, nonfinancial public enterprises and private sector. Deposit money banks
comprise commercial banks and other financial institutions that accept transferable deposits, such
as demand deposits. c) Liquid assets to deposits and short term funding: The ratio of the value
of liquid assets (easily converted to cash) to short-term funding plus total deposits. Liquid assets
include cash and due from banks, trading securities and at fair value through income, loans
and advances to banks, reverse repos and cash collaterals. Deposits and short term funding
includes total customer deposits (current, savings and term) and short term borrowing (money
market instruments, CDs and other deposits). Source: World Bank, Global Financial Development
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database. All series in percent, annual frequency. Banks’ liquidity ratio is computed as liquid assets
to deposits and short term funding divided by bank deposits to output divided by deposit money
banks’ assets to output.
Bid-ask spread
Series: 10-year Government Benchmark bond, bid and ask prices, end-of-day. Source: Reuters and
ECB. Percentage p.a., daily frequency. The bid-ask spread is computed as the difference between
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